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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
W. P. ROGERS and MAGNA MINING
COMPANY, a New Mexico Corporation,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

Case No.
8787

UNITED WESTERN M I N E R A L S
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs and respondents will be referred to as
"respondents;" the defendant and appellant will be referred
to as "appellant."
The appellant's Statement of Facts is substantially
accurate to the extent it has gone; however, appellant has
understandably omitted any reference in its statement and
exhibits to an amendment to the sale contract which is so
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controlling that it alone, we submit, justifies the decision
of the Lower Court.
We respectfully invite the Court's attention to the Appendix hereto (Exhibit I) where there appears a letter
agreement admitted in the pleadings (R. 29) proposed by
appellant and accepted by respondents by the terms of which
the appellant requested and received a postponement of the
commencement of the obligation to pay monthly installments which obligation it now contends is non-existent.1
While we submit that by the clear language of the
original agreement appellant has unqualifiedly undertaken
to pay the minimum monthly installments for which judgment was taken in the Lower Court, this amended portion
of the agreement gives strong additional support to the
judgment, since it is fundamental that in the interpretation of a contract disputed as to its effect a practical construction placed by the parties upon the agreement is the
best evidence of their intent Hardinge Company vs. Eimco
Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 266 P. 2d 494. Universal Sales Corp.
vs. California Press Manufacturing Company, 128 P. 2d
665, 20 c. 2d 751.
We propose to show that the first integrated contract
is susceptible of no other interpretation than that placed
on it by the Lower Court without reference to this document. The amendment is, however, a part of the agreement
ISee next to last paragraph of letter agreement (Exhibit I). In paragraph 3 of the original agree1nent (R. 4), the appellant undertook to
commence the n1inilnum contract payments six 1nonths after date of
the agreement (August 4, 1955) making the first installment due
February 4, 1~56. The amendatory letter agreement extends this date
to April 4, 1956.
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in dispute and within its four corners and is to be considered whether or not the Court determines there is any ambiguity. As appellant declared in its brief we admit and
still insist that the contract is not ambiguous.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO DISMISS.

POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT IT
WAS IMMATERIAL WHETHER OR NOT MINERALS OR ORES COULD BE PRODUCED
FROM THE MINING CLAIMS.

POINT III.
THE COURT MADE PROPER FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND JUDGMENT.

POINT IV.
THE RESPONDENTS MADE A PROPER ELECTION OF REMEDIES.
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ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT ON POINTS I, II, AND III

POINT I.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO DISMISS.

POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT IT
WAS IMMATERIAL WHETHER OR NOT MINERALS OR ORES COULD BE PRODUCED
FROM THE MINING CLAIMS.

POINT Ill.
THE COURT MADE PROPER FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND JUDGMENT.
We agree that the contract must be analyzed in its
entirety; that the Court cannot rewrite it; and that the
contract must receive a reasonable interpretation. We are
confident, however, that the parties indulged in none of
the highly academic refinements of logic and grammar expressed in appellant's brief.
We will attempt to show that the interpretation of the
Lower Court gave effect to and harmonized all of the provisions of the disputed agreement; that the contrary would
be true should the appellant now prevail. We propose to
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divide the argument on these combined points into two
parts: 1, the practical construction of the court below, and
2, the impracticality of that appellant seeks.

1. THE PRACTICAL C 0 N S T R U C T I 0 N
PLACED ON THE AGREEMENT BY THE
LOWER COURT:
Read in its entirety and as written by the parties, the
Trial Court attached to the sale contract its only reasonable
interpretation by finding that the following were its salient
provisions :
A. This was a sale-as opposed to a lease-by which
the appellant covenanted to buy and the respondents covenanted to sell the mining claims for a fixed and definite
amount (R. 3, para. 2).
B. That respondents did not-as no rational person
would do-hazard the risks involved in guaranteeing the
presence of a body of ore.
C. That any reference to payments "out of production" referred only to the rate of payment ; not the total
amount.
D. Most importantly, that the appellant had an unqualified obligation to produce-as distinguished from prospect or operate-said claims in order to alter its obligation
to pay $500.00 per month.
The appellant in its brief has misstated the ruling of
the Trial Court in asserting under Point III of its brief that
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the Court made a finding that "performance of work in
mining said claims" would not relieve appellant of the
monthly obligation. The Court did not so order (R. 32).
The appellant has done no "mining" but placed in evidence
the fact that they had only explored or prospected the
claims. They admitted that they had produced no ore (R.
134). Throughout the contract, the language is that appellant is obliged to pay $500.00 per month in lieu of mining
and producing said claims. The verb "mine" means to "produce minerals" and is not synonymous with explore, develop, prospect, or expend money upon, mining claims. The
word "mining" contemplates the extracting of valuable
minerals. Nephi Company vs. Juab County, 33 Utah 114,
93 P. 53. See also American Mining Law, 4th Edition, Vol.
1, page 27 and note 181. _
The parties clearly contemplated this situation:
1.

Ore may or may not be present.

2. If it is present and is diligently and continuously
mined by appellant, then respondents would accept, against
the total purchase price, 15 per cent of the gross value
thereof whatever that should be.
3. If there is no ore present, or if ore is present and
appellant elects not to mine it, appellant is required to pay
$500.00 a month to apply upon the contract balance.
4. The parties expected that there might be ore present. If there were, the seller would have been entitled to
a more rapid payment of his obligation.
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Under these circumstances, the proviso quoted by the
appellant at page 9 of its brief:

"* * *

so that buyer shall have the· obligation of either continuously mining and operating
said claims so long as ore or minerals can be produced therefrom in commercial quantities, or if it
fails to do so, shall pay sellers the sum of $500.00
each and every month in lieu of production. * * *."
assumes perfect reason: when appellant wasn't mining the
claims, it would have to pay. If appellant were excused, as
it now claims, by absence of ore, why would there have
been added the sentence which appellant omitted to include
ending the proviso which it quoted:
"The sum of $500.00 per month so paid shall be
credited upon the unpaid balance of the purchase
price."
for the reason that it would then be immaterial what balance remained since nothing would be due.
Every contractual provision must be given some meaning (Gates vs. Daines, 3 Utah 2d 95, 279 P. 2d 458) and
this provision can have none if appellant's view is correct.
5. The appellant, however, could mine and produce
the claims, and the respondents, in the interest of early
development and accelerated payment of the balance, would
go along with actual mining activity in lieu of $500.00 per
month, so long as ore could be produced from the claims in
commercial quantities. The Seller (respondents) would not
tolerate a sham "mining" operation to be continued upon
the claims to reduce his monthly payment after it was de-
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termined that commercial quantities of ore could not be
recovered. In this connection it is important to note that
the respondents, when the mine was producing, would receive only 15% of the gross mineral production whether
that were more or less than $500.00 per month (R. p. 4,
para. 3 of the contract and R. p. 104 and page 9 of appellant's brief as to agreed statement by counsel regarding
this point) . Reading the proviso again :
"The buyer at its option may pay $500.00 per
month after six months from the date of this agreement in lieu of working and mining said claims so
that buyer shall have the obligation of either continuously mining and operating said claims so long
as ore or minerals can be produced therefrom in
commercial quantities, * * *"
Thus giving Buyer the option to determine which it shall
do only during that period within which commercial production can be realized.
This, we submit is the only reasonable interpretation
of the agreement and the only one under which all the provisions of the agreement can be harmonized and given
effect.
2. THE IMPRACTICALITY OF THE INTERPRETATION SOUGHT BY APPELLANT:
The appellant contends that in order to prevail the
respondents should have been required to plead and prove
the existence of a body of commercial ore. Appellant is
saying that the Seller, in order to recover the purchase price
of the claims, must prove that he has sold the Buyer an ore
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body sufficient in size and value to pay the full purchase
price out of 15 per cent of its production. The minute 15%
of production failed to satisfy the contract balances the
obligation stops. If this view is adopted, what possible
value can the provision for a minimum $500.00 monthly
payment have?
The appellant also is contending that the respondents,
having conveyed and completely divested themselves of
ownership of the claims/ are subject to condition upon
recovery of the balance of the consideration which condition is wholly within the power of the appellant to fulfill
or not to fulfill. In other words, would any reasonable person convey title to mining claims, or any other property,
with a balance remaining which was to be paid at a minimum rate of $500.00 per month, but confer on Buyer absolute control over the property with the provision that should
it not see fit to make the property productive, the unpaid
purchase price would be forgiven. This construction not
only neutralizes all effect of the minimum provision for
payment of $500.00 per month, it also militates against
sound reason.
The construction argued by the appellant would abrogate all of the following provisions of the agreement:
1.

The provision for a fixed, definite, consideration.

ii.

That something be paid each and every month
(either $500.00 or 15% of a bona-fide and
producing mining operation).

Respondent conveyed the claims on acceptance of title ( R. 5, paras.
7, 8, 9).
2
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iii.

That the Sellers may, at theilr option, either
retake the claims or pursue any other remedy
they may have at law (para. 10 of the agreement) in event of buyer's default.

iv.

The provision for any payment further than
the down payment, since thereafter the entire
contract would, if interpreted as urged by appellant, become illusory, without mutuality of
agreement, since nothing else would be required of appellant. In this connection see
Ross vs. Producers Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d
396, 295 P. 2d 339, holding: "Wherever possible, a contract should be so construed that
there are mutually binding promises on each
party.

v.

The provision that the contract is to effect a
sale of the properties.

v1.

The provision that the Seller is to receive
$500.00 per month under any circumstances.

We respectfully submit that the contentions of appellant fall squarely within the interdiction of Section 236 (a)
of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law
of Contracts which states :
"An interpretation which gives a reasonable,
lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations
of intention is preferred to an interpretation which
leaves a part of such manifestations unreasonable,
unlawful or of no effect."
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POINT IV.
THE RESPONDENTS MADE A PROPER ELECTION OF REMEDIES.
We fail to see in this action any issue regarding election of remedies.
At the time of the pre-trial the appellant demanded
that the respondents elect which remedy they would pursue
(R. 117). Considerable discussion followed and an election
was made by plaintiffs (R. 124) to pursue the remedy
which resulted in the award by the Court below.
The Court allowed the election of the respondents and
entered it into the pre-trial order (R. 31).
We admit that an election was required at the time of
pre-trial. The appellant seems to be saying that where
inconsistent remedies are asked, the plaintiff cannot recover
under either. This argument does not comport with Rule
8 (e) (2) URCP allowing a pleader to state inconsistent
claims for relief.
The ruling of the Trial Court in its pre-trial order
amounted to an amendment to the pleading by leave of the
Court. Rule 16 ( 2) states :
Hln any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before
it for a conference to consider: * * *
"(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings. * * *"
We are confident the appellant is not serious in its
contention that the respondents did not make a suitable
election of remedies.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully contend that the Trial Court placed
upon the agreement the only reasonable and rational interpretation it is susceptible of receiving; that every provision
was given meaning to effect harmony with every other
provision, and that the Court properly ordered at conclusion of the pre-trial that respondents were entitled to pursue the remedy on which the Court awarded judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs,
and Respondents.
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APPENDIX
EXHIBIT I
UNITED WESTERN MINERALS COMPANY
136 West Palace Ave.
Santa Fe, New Mexico
November 2, 1955
Mr. W. P. Rogers and Magna Mining Company
Farmington, New Mexico
Gentlemen:
We have today accepted the title to the federal mining
claims designated as Coleman Canyon group and Phoebe
group, situate in Garfield County, Utah. The terms of the
agreement, dated August 4, 1955, call for the following consideration payable by United Western Minerals Company,
in addition to the amount of $125,000 to be paid out of 15%
of the gross mineral production from the Coleman Canyon
group of claims.
The consideration of the Coleman Canyon group, in
addition to the above mentioned payment out of mineral
production, is $15,000 in cash and $15,000 in cash or common stock of our company, valued at $1.00 per share.
The consideration for the Phoebe group is $6,300, payable in cash or common stock of our Company, valued at
$1.00 per share.
We have elected to pay $15,000 in cash, and $21,300
in common stock, that is 21,300 shares of our common stock.
We have heretofore deposited $3,000 with the First
National Bank as escrow agent. This amount of $3,000
will be released to you by our Company.
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There remains a cash balance of $12,000 payable to
you by United Western Minerals Company. The balance of
$12,000 will be paid in the following manner, $2,000 by our
check, $5,000 within thirty days and $5,000 within sixty
days from the date of this letter.
The release of the escrow deposit of $3,000, the payment of $2,000, and the issuance of 21,300 shares of common stock will be made upon delivery to our Company of
satisfactory mining deeds to the Coleman Canyon group
and the Phoebe group of claims.
The date for the beginning of payments out of gross
mineral production, provided for in clause 3 of the Agreement of August 4, 1955, will be postponed until April 4,
1956.
Kindly signify your approval of the foregoing terms
for payment of the consideration payable under the Agreement of August 4, 1955, by signing the endorsement at the
foot of this letter.
Sincerely yours,
jsj Alva A. Simpson, Jr.

AASjar
APPROVED:
jsj W. P. Rogers

W. P. Rogers

ALVA A. SIMPSON, JR.
President
MAGNA MINING CO.
By:

/s/ W. P. Rogers
Gen. Mgr.
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